Background of the Case

This case commentary examines the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr., 2026 INSC 616, delivered on 2 June 2026 by a Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe. The dispute goes back to 15 December 2009, when the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways issued a preliminary notification under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, for acquiring land in Bellary district, Karnataka. This land included a parcel belonging to Respondent No. 1, T. Younis. Once a declaration was issued under Section 3D(2), the land vested absolutely in the Central Government, and the competent authority fixed compensation in 2011.

NHAI invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act. The Arbitrator revised the market value of the land in 2013, though the High Court later set aside that award and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. On remand, the Arbitrator passed a new award in February 2022, extending certain benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Both parties then approached the Arbitrator again under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. NHAI sought correction of the award under Section 33(1)(a), while Younis asked for an additional fifty percent over the market value under Section 33(4). By a common order dated 4 July 2022, the Arbitrator dismissed both applications, and NHAI received the certified copy on 15 September 2022.

NHAI subsequently filed applications under Section 34 to set aside the award, along with applications seeking condonation of delay, since more than three months had passed since the original award. Younis objected, contending that the Section 34 applications were filed beyond the condonable period. The District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, condoned the delay, but the Karnataka High Court reversed this finding. It held that NHAI’s Section 33 application was, in substance, an attempt to modify the award rather than correct a clerical error, and therefore could not extend the limitation period under Section 34(3). NHAI then approached the Supreme Court.

Argument by the Appellant

Senior counsel for NHAI argued that since both parties had filed applications under Section 33, NHAI could not reasonably have been expected to file its Section 34 application before those requests were decided. It was submitted that the High Court had wrongly relied on State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. and had failed to exclude the time spent on the Section 33 proceedings while computing limitation. NHAI maintained that its Section 33(1)(a) application had sought only the correction of computational and clerical errors and was not, in substance, an attempt to review the award. Reliance was placed on Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav, and it was contended that the question raised was no longer open, having already been settled by earlier decisions of the Court.

Argument by the Respondent

Counsel for Younis argued that NHAI’s Section 33 application was, in reality, an attempt to reopen the substantive findings of the award, and therefore fell outside the narrow scope permitted under Section 33(1)(a). It was submitted that only an application genuinely maintainable under Section 33 should be allowed to defer the running of limitation under Section 34(3). Relying on Damani Construction, it was contended that an arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio once it renders its award, and cannot reopen the merits of the dispute through a disguised Section 33 application. It was further argued that even if NHAI were given the benefit of excluding this period, its Section 34 applications were still filed beyond the statutory outer limit of 120 days.

Decision of the Court and Reasoning

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the District Judge’s order condoning the delay. Interpreting Section 34(3), the Bench held that where a request under Section 33 has been made, limitation for a Section 34 application runs from the date that request is disposed of, and the provision draws no distinction between requests that succeed and those that are dismissed. The Court reasoned that the statute does not confine this benefit to a request that is later found to be maintainable, and reading in such a qualification would mean adding words the legislature never used.

The Bench explained that once a party formally invokes Section 33 and the tribunal entertains the request, the award remains open to correction for as long as that request is pending, and a party should not have to file a protective Section 34 application purely out of caution while Section 33 proceedings are still going on. It relied on its own earlier rulings in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav and Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, both of which had already taken the view that limitation runs from the disposal of the Section 33 request.

On Damani Construction, the Court distinguished it on facts. In that case, there had been no formal Section 33 application at all, only a letter seeking review, so it could not have extended limitation. Here, by contrast, both parties had filed properly framed Section 33 applications within time, and the tribunal had actually entertained and disposed of them together. The Court also cautioned that where Section 33 applications turn out to be sham or filed merely to buy time, courts remain free to impose exemplary costs, so this interpretation does not open the door to misuse. On facts, since NHAI received the Section 33 order in September 2022 and filed its Section 34 applications about two months later, the Court found the applications were well within time and directed that they now be decided on their own merits.

Conclusion

This judgment brings welcome clarity to how Sections 33 and 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act work together. By holding that limitation runs from the disposal of any formally filed Section 33 request, regardless of its outcome, the Court has removed the uncertainty that would otherwise follow if parties had to guess, at the time of filing, whether their earlier application would later be treated as maintainable. This protects genuine litigants who pursue a statutory remedy in good faith, while the Court’s caution against sham or frivolous Section 33 applications preserves a check against misuse of this benefit. The decision also reaffirms that a party need not file protective Section 34 proceedings out of abundant caution while its Section 33 request is still pending, which should help reduce unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. Going forward, this ruling gives parties in arbitration matters a clearer and more predictable timeline within which to pursue their post-award remedies.

References

National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr., 2026 INSC 616.
Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav, 2025 INSC 1021.
Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3181.
State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co., (2007) 10 SCC 742.

Lakshya Pratap Singh, Chandigarh University, Mohali, Punjab